Dilmah - Cricket Network

EXTREME PREJUDICE: EMOTIONS, FANS & COMMENTARY
Michael Roberts - 16 September 2006

Sport fans are a diverse lot. But all clubs and all international sides have a body of passionate supporters. These fervent fans are intensely attached to their side and invest a great deal of emotion in discussing performance and selection issues. Theirs is a vicarious investment, producing great adrenaline rushes when matches are won and their team is riding high.

The flip side is the low, the moments of depression when their team is not merely defeated, but mauled. Such moments generate intense criticism of the side’s coach, selectors and players. Virulence is the name of their reaction.

Logically, one would expect such criticism to range from comments that are pertinent to those that are ill-informed as well as ridiculous. In either form most comments are as accusative as assertive, permeated by a conviction that the opinion is valid. My interest is in the considerable body of ill-founded criticism presented in extreme tones, sometimes to the degree vitriolic. This interest arises in part from my professional trade, one that involves an analysis of political ideology and practice. That is to say, researching nationalist and communalist excesses has been part of my stock-in-trade.

Likewise, the field of popular culture has been one of the areas pertinent to my teaching and research work. Given an avid, personal engagement with cricket, it was but one step for me to engage with the popular culture within cricket by participating in the discussions within some cyber-sites, especially www.cricket.dilmahtea.com. This occurred between the years 2005 and 2007. Recently, though, I “retired hurt” in a manner of speaking. For one, pressures of other work suggested a re-ordering of priorities. Secondly, the discussions got to the point of being exhausting and aggravating: for some of the virulence can as nasty as brutish.

My recent trip to Sri Lanka enabled me to engage the opinions of others who are involved in cricket analysis as part of their vocation, namely, the journalists and commentators on TV or radio. This was during the India versus Sri Lanka series involving three Test Matches and five ODI games (of which I witnessed all, except for the three ODI at Premadasa Stadium). Armed with a press pass I had the best view ever, behind the wickets and high above the cricket pitch in the company of many knowledgeable individuals, both male and female.

At odd moments our discussions dwelt on the topic of partisanship among the commentators. Sambit Bal and Sai Mohapatra indicated that their role was to be non-partisan, even when India were one of the combatants out there on the field. Thus, they stood by their self-conviction that they themselves had the capacity to take a clinical attitude towards what was unfolding in front of their eyes. I have every reason to believe in this capacity on their part. Likewise, I have been often impressed by the degree of non-partisan fairness that such TV commentators as Ian Chappell, Tony Greig and Ian Bishop bring to their reviews – even where their home-country is playing.

Speaking for myself though, I am not certain that I can quite achieve such a degree of freedom from bias if I was ever placed in their shoes (unlikely that). Perhaps for this reason I am attracted to another contention: that good commentary calls for a measure of passionate partisanship in favour of one side on the field, albeit balanced by a clinical analytical capacity and an awareness of this leaning. Such a position, arguably, can enliven discussion.

Logically, this means that a good TV or radio team should involve a mix of individuals who are non-partisan/clinical (the Sambit Bals of this world) and those moderately partisan. In terms of this logic, as a further step, it seems so sensible to have at least one-third of the team of TV commentators drawn from countries that are not party to the contest. Sri Lankan sides have consistently faced imbalanced bodies of commentators when they toured the West, with five from the home side and at best one Sri Lankan (or, alternatively, Michael Holding or a third party). Never were the ramifying disadvantages of this imbalance more evident than during the tour of South Africa in late 2002. The bias displayed so consistently by Pat Symcox and most of the Saf commentators (Wessels and Haysman excepted) was as thick as their accent. That was why I directed an essay against the “Blatant Discrimination in TV Commentary from South Africa” in the style of a fervent fan (Essaying Cricket, Colombo, Yapa Publications, pp. 77-78). But this was preceded by another article on “Weighted Cricket Commentary” that fulminated against the bias and ignorance of some of the English commentators during Sri Lanka’s tour in the summer of 2002 (Essaying Cricket, pp. 57-62).

PART II
Jaundiced Fans
It is the extremism of the fans, however, that interests me most as a research field. It is the extremism turned inward in violent condemnation of their very own that serves as the foundation for the next set of comments. The Dilmah site provides the material. In drawing empirical material (experiential in memory bank) from this source I will focus mostly on the commentary around the ODI matches and teams because such matches clog the SL cricket calendar and draw the most comment.

I have no way of saying whether the fervent cricket-buffs who pen comments within this site are typical of Sri Lankan cricket fans or not. I exclude one weirdo who has recently appeared and whose opinions are in keeping with the pseudonym that he has adopted insofar as they are shot through with nonsense, no-sense and no balls. At the other pole I do attend to a regular voice whom I shall call “Mister Insistent” because he has been, so to speak, a “permanent resident” within the Dilmah cricket site, because he presents long missives, because he now has iconic status in the circle, because he is quite dogmatic in his views and because, above all, he embodies the shortcomings that I shall be highlighting. His regular participation has actually improved his prose, which is now readable though still occasionally chaotic. Likewise, his criticisms have developed better balance, though still veering to the extreme and in this sense they serve as a touchstone for my illustration of jaundiced commentary.

As one would expect, the comments within the Dilmah site are quite varied. Many fierce debates arise. But even across this virulent debate a form of cyber-net mateship has developed among opposing voices and on occasions a cluster of voices produce a chorus of agreement that the Selectors have erred on such-and-such (quite chummy this).

One topic that has drawn a steady stream of support is criticism of the SL Selectors for consistently favouring Jehan Mubarak over other candidates when they have chosen the Sri Lankan squads. This complaint has good foundations and some critics have backed up their claims with statistical data and analytical presentations. This issue has been just one instance of regular charges against the Selection Committee for its prejudices. As frequent has been the castigation of SL’s batsmen for their batting failures and more specifically their weaknesses on seaming pitches – again with some foundations, but overdone and insufficiently attentive to the worldwide failures in this regard and the difficulties of seaming pitches and tall bowlers (taller on average than in the past; e.g. Ishant Sharma, Asif Mohammed).

As with virulence in all fields of passion, the body of opinions within www.cricket.dilmahtea.com – weighed as a body and thus excluding exceptional voices of balanced commentary -- is blind to its own prejudices. It is this prejudice, and its poor analytical grounding, that I shall highlight here.

As a broad generalization I note that over the last three-four years the following Sri Lankan cricketers have generally received favourable commentary and tend to be “apples in the Dilmah eye:” Kumar Sangakkara, Chaminda Vaas, Chamara Kapugedera, Malinga Bandara, Lasith Malinga and, now, Ajantha Mendis. Chamara Silva and Michael Van Dort also had a favourable press at some stages in the immediate past, but have now been relegated to the realm of the dubious.

The list of names above suggests that on-field performance has been one yardstick, but the story is more complex. That complexity and the reasons behind it can be developed by comparing the group above with the Lankan cricketers who have been, in my evaluation, regularly subject to prejudiced comment, viz., Russel Arnold, Rangana Herath, Nuwan Kulasekera and TM Dilshan.

To the latter list one can add Mahela Jayewardene who was subject to a series of hostile opinions during the tour of India in 2005 and the subsequent tour of Australia in early 2006. This arose in part from opinions formed about his supposed reaction when he was deposed as Vice-Captain by the choice of Vaas (the latter act involving a conspiracy back in Colombo which was not brought into the reckoning even though it was pertinent to the context). The animus that took root at this point remains still at some depth and Mahela is the victim of severe attacks whenever some lapse as batsman and, now, as captain occurs. The hostility against Mahela has been muted of late because of a string of relative successes, but one can be certain that the knives will appear once again when some failures occur. The point about extreme prejudice is that it is usually fixed and incorrigible.

I deem these views “extreme prejudice” of a partisan kind (A) because they are grounded in a crude reading of statistical figures without attention to the nuances of the ODI format and (B) because they involve knee-jerk reactions of a slash and burn kind that does not attend to team building over the long-run and (C) because they are usually directed by the statistics and impressions from the latest round of ODI games.

An ODI batting line-up calls for different, complementary talents. This should be starkly obvious. Thus one cannot expect No. 6 and 7 in the line-up to end a series or a career with the same averages as those at the top-end of the line, though one would anticipate a better strike rate (allowing for exceptions of the Gilchrist-Sehwag-Jayasuriya type). Thus, in my book, for a critic to utilise averages during one series to demand the exclusion of a late middle-order batsman (say, Dilshan) is an instance of prejudice. It often means that little cameos at the tail-end of the innings are forgotten in contrast to a 60 or 90 runs scored by a batsman at No. 3.

This tendency is exacerbated by the impatience of cyber-critics (some with limited cricketing experience) who demand the exclusion of a player if he fails in 3 out of 4 innings in a series of five -- unless he a favoured son. This is short-term, knee jerk ad-hockery. It is exacerbated by the fact that there is no detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each “failure” (e.g. where the umpire ahs made a mistake, a unplayable ball).
The reasons for such reactions are clear. The emotional investment in the team demands outstanding scores. A relative failure inspires hostility to X or Y. Hope for transformation encourages the critic to indulge in wishful thinking: R and S have done well in the domestic circuit or with Sri Lanka’s A Team. Ergo, replace X and Y with R and S. But, then, what?

Let me spell out the complications attached to such policies over the long term by taking the hypothetical case of an ODI team which has seven batsmen and four bowlers; and then focusing on the batting line-up alone. In Series One we have A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Then, when B and F fail, they are replaced with new hopes H and I. But in Series Two, I and G fail. They are promptly replaced with new hopes J and K in the middle order for Series Three. And so on.

This means that in a relatively short space of time one has created an unstable middle order and that new recruits have been given limited opportunities. It is a recipe for chaos that hinders team building and development of trust in each others’ capacities through regular interaction in match situations. Such trust is central to running between the wickets, but has other ramifications: the point was driven home to me by Tom Moody in an illuminating interview in early 2006 that clarified the manner in which he nourished self-analysis and dialogue at team meetings by asking players to address specific “scenario puzzles” in a game situation. Through such exchanges players learnt to think for themselves, discovered other options and discovered how their team-mates thought. In tight on-field situations these mutual understandings can be of critical significance.

Because of reactive, short-term chopping and changing, chaos was precisely the outcome with ODI selections in the era 1999-2003 and why such players as Indika de Saram, Chamara Silva and Dilshan had to struggle with spasmodic opportunities. The musical chairs in selections were in turn due to musical chairs in the composition of Selection Committees arising from the musical chairs in governing boards.

When Tom Moody was appointed coach with an explicit overview of the whole coaching system (at his insistence), he immediately pinpointed the chaotic character of selections at both top XV and A Squad levels. Some 70-80 players had entered the lists over a short span of time, though not all had been given playing time. He argued for greater continuity and a longer trial for new recruits to any squad. Ashantha de Mel listened. It is a result of such a sensible policy that, recently, Van Dort was not ditched after three failures in the first two tests against India and that the ODI XI remained more or less the same for four matches.

Thus, in this argument the slash-and-burn hacking out of players who do not perform too well in one series and the insertion of new personnel at every turn is a recipe for disaster. Such a policy, one beloved by several within the Dilmah site, undermines team building. This danger is compounded when the evaluations of failure are based on unsound criteria involving the assessment of middle-order batsmen at Nos. 6 and 7 (and even at No. 5) on the same statistical foundations applied to Nos. 1-4. In his interview with Sambit Bal recently Mahela Jayawardene made this truism explicit:

For me, ten runs from a batsman for the team are much more valuable than a selfish fifty or hundred. I have had a lot of discussions with selectors. In one-day cricket sometimes players go out there and don't get many opportunities, especially at Nos 5, 6 and 7, but they do all the dirty work for the team. They get those 30s and 40s and take risks and dive and save runs and create wickets and take half-chances. You need that kind of quality in your team …

Allowing for remarkable exceptions, such as Michael Bevan and Michael Hussey, the differences are marked out at the end of a batsman’s career. Thus, take Hashan Tillakaratne (often No. 6) in comparison with Asanka Gurusinha who was often No. 3. Hashan had 13 fifties in 168 innings at international level, or 7.7% of the time, as opposed to 22 fifties from Gurusinha or 15.3% of the time.

An abiding feature of the cyber-world debates has been the tendency to emphasise the raw averages of middle-order batsmen over one series or over the last couple of years and to compound this gross evaluation by failing to undertake a case by case review of the matches in the immediate past and the circumstances bearing on performances. It is no accident, then, that such middle-order batsmen as Arnold and Dilshan have suffered at the hands of these gross evaluations and been among those at the receiving end of prejudice. Let me illustrate my contention by dwelling on specific examples of biased assessment during the recent past.

PART III
Arnold Victimized

Russel Arnold (who retired from SL cricket in 2007) was hardly an elegant batsman and this may be one reason why he won so little favour in some cyber-net circles. But he was a team player to the core and an effective batsman in the difficult situation of the middle-order. Thus, his career ODI statistics read as follows: 155inns, 43 not outs, 3950 runs, 35.26 average with 28 fifties and a strike rate of 72.55 – statistics that are roughly on par with those of Paul Collingwood for England (av. 35.13; s/r 76.31). Note that Collingwood’s 24 fifties were compiled in 14.9% of his innings as against the 18% registered by Arnold (28 fifties). Further comparative light is provided when we look at the statistics for Hashan Tillakaratne: 168 inns, 40 not outs, 3789 runs, average of 29.60 and a strike rate of 57.56, with 13 fifties, that is over 50 in 7.7% of his innings.

Pronounced antipathy to Arnold was revealed within the Dilmah site during the triangular series in Australia with South Africa and Australia in early 2006. There were nine league matches played by Sri Lanka and many of the voices hostile to Arnold were in agreement with the selectors (headed then by Lalith Kaluperuma) when he was – absurdly in my view – dropped from the team in favour of Mubarak and Kapugedera for the crucial game at Bellerive against the Safs. These antipathetic voices had been vociferous for a while, but Arnold’s importance was stoutly argued for by one bloke called Roberts and two other chaps, a Lankan named Crossing Dili and an Australian writing under the pseudonym “Leopard.”

When Sri Lanka won that game at Bellerive and entered the finals (against most Aussie expectations), Arnold was returned to the XI for all three games in place of Mubarak. Sent in at No. 5 rather than No. 6 he made scores of 24, 64 n/o, and 76 -- so that his series statistics were boosted and read as follows: 10 inns, 4 not outs, 321 runs, 53.50 average [s/r not indicated in my source]. Compare this set of numbers with those for relevant others during the same series:

Kapugedera: 5 inns, zero n/o; 73 runs; 14.60 average;
Mubarak (whose position in the order varied): 8 inns, zero n/o; 20.25 average;
Dilshan: 11 inns, 2 n/o; 277 runs, 30.77 average.

It is because of his immense value to the side in this particular series (and his extra value as occasional bowler) that Arnold was a permanent member of the playing XI during the World Cup in the Caribbean – leaving no space for Atapattu [who was actually displaced by Tharanga and Chamara Silva in Atapattu’s favoured positions]. However, the persisting bias against Arnold was revealed during the middle of this series when one regular Dilmah contributor, an engineer working in the Gulf States, asserted that Arnold should be dropped from the playing XI. Now, in the early matches Sri Lanka piled up high scores and because Arnold was slotted in at No. 7 (and once even at No. 8), he came in at the tail-end of most innings. So his statistics in serial order read thus (with number of balls faced within brackets and an asterisk indicating “not out”): 03*(4), 05*(5), 19*(13), 04*(4), 20(22), d-n-b, 03(10) prior to the finals. The strike-rate is good and it is not till the seventh match that he records a failure. This suggests that Engineer S was (is) rather dim, or that he was impelled by some deep-seated prejudice hidden from our view.

Kulasekera Victimized

Kulasekera came into my radar screen during the tours of New Zealand and Australia in 2005/06. His pitch-cluster map was quite impressive on occasions. Moreover, as Hathurusinghe told me recently, he is an “intelligent bowler.” But Kulasekera bowls at military medium pace and though he can make the ball skid and has some nip, his pace does not consistently enter the 130-135 speed mark. This seems to be the reason why he is treated dismissively by some cyber-net pundits, who favour bowlers with greater speed, such Welagedera and Thilina Thushara among the newcomers. Thus, several voices indulging in selections of the ODI Squad for the series against India in 2008 excluded Kulasekera from the list despite previous ODI performances of a useful character in the Caribbean and Australia (though not in the Asia Cup in Pakistan).

Earlier, when the ODI Squad for Australia was announced in January 2008 Mister Insistent laughed sarcastically and remarked that Kulasekera would enjoy a holiday as he was of little use and would be little used.

I thought otherwise then because there are certain pitch conditions where a steady seam bowler of the Bedser-Shackleton-Alderman mould is more dangerous than a speedster such as Freddie Trueman or Brett Lee. Squads require a balance and a mix of pace bowlers. Events proved me correct: within the limited opportunities provided, and selected only in three matches, Kulasekera had statistics of 26 overs-3 mdns-129 runs and 5 wkts, giving him an average of 17.35 and s/r of 21.00, both way superior to all the other Lankan pacemen; while his economy rate was on par with the others. Overall, of course, his figures are not earth-shattering, but the best from among a mediocre cluster of achievements.

Add to this two other points: Kulasekera can bat better than most of the other pacemen except for the bowling allrounder Maharoof (and perhaps Thushara and Dhammika Prasad). He is also quick around the paddock, as quick as Malinga and Prasad. Overall he is probably the most athletic and reliable of our pacemen in the fielding department. I witnessed his catching of Gambhir during the recent Test Match at the SSC and reckon that none of our pacemen, other than possibly Malinga or Prasad, would have reached the ball and taken it so neatly -- on the run stooping. Such capacities are important to a side.

ODI cricket has evolved to a point where a side cannot have a lumbering bowler (e.g. Nuwan de Zoysa) who leaks runs as a fielder. As it is, Sri Lanka has a problem when both Maharoof and Dilhara Fernando are in the playing XI: although possessing safe hands, they are not agile. During the ODI match at the MCG on 22 February 2008 (watched in person by me) when Australia was in trouble at 4 for 54 on a two-paced pitch, Hussey and Clarke scampered the total upwards to 184 runs by exploiting the limited cricket-quickness displayed by Maharoof, Vaas, Dilruwan Perera and Ishara Amerasinghe in particular. The extra 10-to-15 runs they gleaned added another mountain in front of the SL batsmen in a game where the run-rate came into play because of impending rain.

Dilshan Victimized

Tillakaratne Dilshan, the Tuan Mohamed Dilshan of yesteryear, has an unenviable history. He has been subject to rank prejudice from both Chairman Ashantha de Mel and a body of voices within the Dilmah site (though he also has some who stand by his worth). On one occasion de Mel decided that new blood must be injected into the leading XV and dropped Dilshan so as to accommodate Mubarak in the touring squad to Pakistan – much to the chagrin of Captain Atapattu and others (it cost Lanka Test match loss in my reckoning). More recently, in 2007(?) he was punished by exclusion from a short tour.

Dilshan is widely admired for his electric fielding skills. It is not only a question of his work at the crucial backward point and/or cover position. He is a versatile fieldsmen, good in any position. What is more, just occasionally he produces a miracle wicket through an amazing catch or a stupendous run-out. Ask Damien Martyn about his run-out dismissal at Adelaide in 2006 and Ian Bell about his run-out at Galle last year or ask Prasanna Jayawardene about his catch at leg-slip to dismiss Tendulkar at the SSC [both Test matches, but fielding skills are fielding skills]. The point about miracle wickets is that they lift a fielding and bowling side.

Mister Insistent, however, insists that Dilshan must be evaluated for his contribution as a batsman. Reply: yes, that is the most vital aspect, but not to the total exclusion of other dimensions surely – Dilshan’s fielding and value as occasional bowler must be part of the weighing. To exclude these other considerations is bias. The bias is compounded when no allowance is made for the special circumstances of position No. 6 or No. 7. It is then triple compounded when Dilshan is accused of being “inconsistent” in his batting on the basis of evaluations restricted to the latest series. That is, Dilshan has consistently been subject to the policy of “2 or 3 strikes and you are out” – where “strike” refers to poor score. This is further aggravated when the same principle is not applied to favourite sons such as Chamara Kapugedera – about which more later.

As far as I can work out, one reason for this degree of prejudice may lie in Dilshan’s style of batting. He is certainly impetuous and there is a wham-bang character to his batting that detracts from elegance, but attests to his fighting qualities. The value of his fighting cameos have been displayed on several occasions – but they have not always been etched in memory because Dilshan sometimes does not last till the end of 50 overs (in contrast to Arnold) and sometimes throws his wicket away. Nevertheless, it is significant that during the course of the IPL 20/20 matches Delhi saw the bevy of benefits he brought to their side and replaced Shoaib Malik (Pakistan’s captain no less) with Dilshan for their last set of games.

Dilshan bore the impact of prejudice and that of crude assessments from both Selection Committee and fans during the last ODI series versus India. No account was taken of his highly significant contributions during the Asia Cup a few weeks prior to this. He was dropped from the XI for the fifth ODI because of three “failures.”

Low scores must, however, be evaluated by refined attention to circumstance. Two matches were played at Dambulla, where batsmen usually “have to grind,” as one past cricketer told me when I was there, and where low totals are normal. On this occasion the pitch was relatively better in the afternoon during the second innings. The pitch was at its most difficult in the first 90 minutes or so. In ODI One Sri Lanka received the gift of a second innings and duly won, courtesy of two solid ‘grinds’ by Mahela Jayawardene and Chamara Kapugedera. So Dilshan (and Chamara Silva) did not get to bat when the going was relatively good.

Sent into bat in ODI Two, Sri Lanka collapsed quickly to 4 for little. Dilshan strode in and attacked, while Jaysuriya batted quietly at the other end intent on survival. There was one ugly heave where the dice ran his way: lucky to survive. Then, over the course of a few overs, there followed a crisp pull for four and two punchy off-drives to the boundary. He then pulled a ball towards a gap, but Badrinath closed the space and took a brilliant diving catch. This was perhaps a risky stroke on Dilshan’s part and one can suggest that he should have kept the ball down, but one can also regard it as a little spurt of typical fighting Dilshan, which set the base for more fighting work by Kulasekera and Thushara.

At the Premadasa Stadium whoever won the toss was at an indecent advantage and won the game. That became crystal clear in the very first of the matches Game Three in the series – for the ball seamed as well as turned sharply by the late evening from towards the end of the first innings to the first hours of the second team’s outing. So, batting was relatively easier in the afternoon and rather devilish in the evening/night under lights. Sri Lanka had to cop this fate in Game Three as well as Four. Dilshan was among the several top-order batsmen who failed to score much on both occasions. My first impressions of his stroke in Game III was that it was ‘rash;” but on seeing the video-record I discovered the TV commentator complimenting Munaf Patel for a “good ball.” The point here is that one must attach caveats of different measure to low scores arising from (i) a terrific ball or “jaffa” as the Aussies call it; and (ii) a good ball -- thereby distinguishing those moments from what one can deem a “soft dismissal.” So what I have generated here is a fine-tuned evaluation of Dilshan’s failures in this particular series (44 runs and average of 14.6 in 3 inns) that qualify their implications.

This failure must then be evaluated in conjunction with his record in the other ODI series in 2008:
Australia > 7 inns – 2 n/o – 170 – 62* h/s – 34.00 with 2 fifties.
West Indies > 2 inns -- nil -- 66 -- 64 -- 33.00 with 1 fifty.
Pakistan > 6 inns – nil -- 134 – 56 -- 22.33 with 1 fifty.

Over 30 is a good average for a No. 6/7 if it is accompanied by a good strike-rate. Though Dilshan’s Pakistan figures are the worst of these three sets, in fact, his batting performance here was the most momentous. With Sri Lanka batting first in the finals against India, he was required to enter the field with the score reading 66 for 4 wickets, but Jayasuriya in good nick. He went on to score 56 in 74 balls and took part in a crucial partnership of 131 runs with Jayasuriya (112) so that Sri Lanka eventually totalled 273 runs. This was one of the major turning points in that game in favour of Sri Lanka.

In broader context let me note that his overall ODI international statistics read as 129 inns, 26 n/o, 2994 runs, for an average of 29.02 with 14 fifties and a strike rate of 80.24. Dilshan’s average is below that of Arnold and Collingwood and on a par with Hashan Tillakaratna. But the latter’s strike rate is poor (57.50), whereas Dilshan’s is outstanding – even superior to that of Arnold (72.55), Collingwood (76.31) and Michael Bevan (74.15).

That noted, it is by his recent work that Dilshan must be assessed. So the issue I have raised is this: how recent? Just the last series of ODI games – a kind of instant evaluation? Or on the basis of a number of recent series? I consider it quite horrendous for Selectors to be guided by just the last lot of matches unless the batsman in question has looked all at sea. That is why I have paraded Dilshan’s figures in all four series in 2008. These statistics are meant to counter the slash-and-burn hacksters who follow the principle “three strikes and you are out.”

It also happens that these hacksters are prejudiced in their attitude to Dilshan and have been for quite some time. This bias has been evident over the years in their evaluations of Chamara Kapugedera (hereafter “Kapu”) in comparison with Dilshan at a stage in SL’s cricket when Kapu was batting at No. 6 or no. 7 and in competition with Dilshan for a spot in the final XI.

Visual evaluations of Kapu’s capability by Sri Lanka’s coaching staff seem to have been the basis for the young 19-year old to earn a double-promotion to the highest level as a member of the squad touring Australia in early 2006. During the first final at Adelaide, a game that I witnessed live and recall well, he made a brilliant 38 runs in 21 balls batting at No. 7. Sri Lankan fans seem to have an indelible memory of this ‘affair’ and ever since then he has been a blue-eyed boy. They have not remembered Dilshan’s 26 n/o in 20 balls (mostly in partnership with Kapu) or the four run-outs he effected during the same game. I do. I would have made Dilshan (not Sangakkara) man of the match.

In point of fact Kapu has been no less inconsistent than Dilshan in his ODI performances over the last few years. His terrific 38 notwithstanding, his average during that 2006 Australian series was 14.60 because he scored only 73 runs over 5 innings. Since then he has been up and down in his achievements, though he has improved recently. His overall international ODI statistics read as 36 inns—2 n/o—816 runs—24.00 average with five fifties. So what we see, then, is an application of double-standards by some eager fans.

This does not mean that Kapu should be dropped from the side. He bats tall and can score in the V, while having an ability to clear the ropes. In the fourth ODI versus India at the Premadasa Stadium his innings was excellent and was cut short at 30 runs by a horrid lbw decision. He is also cricket quick and a good fielder. It is now clear that, his modest record notwithstanding, the Sri Lankan hierarchy have identified him as a prospective talent to be nourished and have pencilled him in to bat at No. 4 when Sangakkara opens [and at No. 5/6 perhaps when the latter does not, given the question marks around Chamara Silva]. He has been batting up the order since the tour of the West Indies. For this reason one should not compare his recent statistics with those of Dilshan: my argument is that different criteria apply to No. 4 from those for No. 6 and No. 7. The latter cannot normally be expected to average as much as the No. 4s, but must have a decent strike rate and reveal a capacity to rotate the strike as well (the last criteria is where Chamara Silva seems to fall down).

I am not arguing here for Dilshan’s place in the SL Eleven to be written in stone. As matters stand, the No. 6 spot has Dilshan, Kandamby, Mubarak, Dilruwan Perera, Kaushal Silva and Chamara Silva all vying for them. The order or preference is mine, but that order could be amended after the ongoing ODI games of the A Team in South Africa. Should the Selectors make adjustments in the top-order and bring Warnapura into the line-up, Kapugedera could also be part of the mix for No. 6 [or No. 7 if there is seven/four split and Maharoof is not at 7].

Concluding Thoughts
Statistics can be beguiling. Their aura of precision can mislead. The fact is that 40 runs on a difficult pitch, say, at Dambulla or at Wellington in gale force conditions, are of similar value to some 80-100 runs on a featherbed wicket. Evaluations of specific innings must be fine-tuned to such circumstance and to manner of dismissal, whether bad umpiring decisions or the fact that a batsman entered the scene in the 46th over and got out seeking quick runs.

The further argument here is that we must not be guided by short-term assessments of a knee jerk character. Adequate periods (number of innings) of opportunity must be afforded to newcomers. Different criteria apply to different batting positions. Team-building through some measure of continuity and team balance are also vital considerations, especially in composing touring squads. Self-reflexivity that attends to one’s own subjective prejudices is a further requirement demanded from Selectors, commentators and fans. If one castigates the Selection Committee for prejudice in the free-to-air networks of the cyber-world, then, one must also be able to discern the mote in one’s own eye.

© Dilmah Cricket Network

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